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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right to a jury is so entrenched that the Constitution mentions juries in four different sections: in Article III and in
the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.1 The framers of the Constitution viewed the jury as a powerful check on government.2
Although the Constitution’s “obsession” with juries3 principally derives from a skepticism of government,4 juries serve two additional
functions. The jury is a tool of civic education by allowing citizens to
participate in a fundamental aspect of democracy.5 Additionally, the
jury serves a legitimizing function by instilling public confidence in
legal outcomes.6 Acknowledging these various functions of the jury is
critical to understanding the scope of the jury right and its incidental
protections. When courts fail to recognize the functions that the jury
serves, they risk misconstruing aspects of the right.7 In this Note,
I argue that courts have failed to account for the functions of the jury
when applying one aspect of the right—the fair cross section
guarantee.
The fair cross section guarantee derives from the Sixth Amendment’s “impartial jury” requirement and recognizes that “the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.”8 As a result, juries must be drawn
from jury venires that represent a fair cross section of the community
where the trial is heard.9 To determine whether there is a violation of
the fair cross section requirement, the Supreme Court developed a
three-prong test in Duren v. Missouri.10
Unfortunately, the current application of the Duren test in lower
courts undermines, rather than supports, the functions of the jury. In
1
Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Relationship with
the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 964 (2010).
2
See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 48 (2007)
(describing how the early American jury system developed, in part, to provide a counterweight to English colonial rule by “allow[ing] the injection of local norms and values into
legal disputes”).
3
Larsen, supra note 1, at 964.
4
See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
23 (1994) (noting that “[t]he Anti-Federalist case for preserving local juries grew directly
from colonial experience in using juries to resist the Crown”).
5
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (“The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the
principal justifications for retaining the jury system.”); JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 5 (2010) (writing that “the jury serves the juror, as a student of democracy”).
6
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 75 (suggesting that representative juries “offer[ ] more legitimacy for the resulting verdict”).
7
See infra Part III.
8
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1975).
9
Id. at 529–30.
10
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
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applying Duren, courts often require that defendants show not only a
systematic failure to create jury venires representing a fair cross section of the community but also how the jury-selection procedure
causes nonrepresentative jury venires.11 Placing the burden on the
defendant to prove how a specific jury-selection procedure is responsible for nonrepresentative jury venires is a high bar that often renders
the fair cross section guarantee illusory.12 This high bar leads courts
to endorse jury-selection procedures that are inadequate for compiling representative jury venires, which, in turn, leads to persistent
underrepresentation of distinctive groups.13 As a result, defendants
are denied the opportunity to have a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.14 Potential jurors from certain groups within
a community may be regularly overlooked for jury service.15 And,
over time, juries that are not representative of the community undermine the public’s faith in legal outcomes.16
To remedy this situation, courts should rethink how they apply
Duren. Rather than require that defendants prove how the juryselection procedure causes nonrepresentative jury venires, courts
should presume that jury-selection procedures are inadequate when
distinctive groups are regularly excluded from jury venires. Indeed,
such an approach is consistent with Duren.17 Presuming that the juryselection procedure is a cause of persistent underrepresentation will
reduce the risk that inadequate procedures go unchallenged and ultimately lead to more representative jury venires.18 As a result, defendants will be protected from prejudicial jury-selection practices;
potential jurors from underrepresented groups will be more likely to
have the opportunity to participate in a fundamental aspect of demo11
See Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a Sixth
Amendment fair cross section challenge because “there is simply nothing in the record
indicating that the racial disparity at issue was caused by the [district court’s] jury selection
procedures”).
12
See Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: Some Lessons on
Empiricism in Jury Representation Cases, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 911, 954 (“[T]he law has
constructed an extremely high bar to recognizing disparities in representation, and the law
expects defendants to untangle highly complicated questions of causal explanation.”).
13
See id. at 948–52 (outlining how a case that “capture[d] the causes of African-American underrepresentation in . . . jury pools” survived constitutional scrutiny).
14
See id. at 952 (noting that the difficulty in disaggregating purposeful versus
inadvertent minority underrepresentation in jury-selection pools can lead to judicial support for suboptimal jury-selection procedures, ultimately resulting in minority
underrepresentation).
15
See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 127–31 (arguing that drawing jurors by noncross-sectional methods, such as voter lists, can lead to underrepresentation of certain minority groups, the young, and the poor).
16
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 75.
17
See infra Part II.F.
18
See infra Part IV.
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cratic governance; and the public’s faith in legal outcomes will be
bolstered.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses the three major
functions of the jury. Part II traces the rise of the fair cross section
guarantee and explains the current Supreme Court approach to evaluating fair cross section challenges. It then explores how lower courts
apply this approach and how this application is inconsistent with
Duren. Part III discusses how the current application of Duren fails to
support the three major functions of the jury. Part IV proposes a remedy: creating a presumption of causation when the defendant demonstrates a pattern of underrepresentation of distinctive groups on jury
venires.
I
THE FUNCTIONS

OF THE

JURY

Although scholars have described the functions of the jury in different ways and from different perspectives,19 the jury serves three major functions: (1) checking government power; (2) encouraging civic
participation; and (3) providing legitimacy to the legal system.
A. Check on Government Power
Historically, in criminal cases, the jury has been understood as a
critical check on the power of the government.20 William Blackstone
explained: “Our law has . . . wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the
people and the prerogative of the crown.”21 Early American juries
were, perhaps, even more conscious of their role as a buffer between
the state and the individual. According to Joan Larsen, colonial and
founding-era juries “were prized for their ability to counterbalance
and compete with legislative and judicial power.”22 Indeed, colonial
juries had the authority to find both facts and law, which “led to the
jury system playing a critical role in resisting English imperial rule.”23
19
See generally Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J.
1331, 1333–90 (2012) (evaluating the civil jury as a political institution and noting four
functions of the civil jury).
20
See id. at 1337 (“The clearest example of [juries providing a check on government
power in criminal cases] is the jury’s role . . . in checking the government’s role as prosecutor.”); see also PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 21 (1984) (noting that a fundamental purpose of the jury “has been to buttress or buffer official power”).
21
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1968) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *342, *349) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
Larsen, supra note 1, at 968–69.
23
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 51.
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Similar to criminal juries, civil juries impede abusive government
power.24 The civil jury provided colonists with a degree of local democratic control over the law.25 While this democratic lawmaking function is less obvious today, in many ways it still persists.26 By injecting
community standards into mixed questions of law and fact, particularly in tort law, civil juries continue to exercise a lawmaking function.27 Furthermore, debates about jury nullification continue to
highlight a belief in some quarters that juries should create law in
special situations.28
Whether in the civil or criminal context, the jury’s function as a
check on government protects litigants. In the criminal context, the
jury protects defendants. In 1879, the Supreme Court, for the first
time, applied the Equal Protection Clause to overturn a conviction on
the basis that the defendant was denied a jury of peers.29 In the civil
context, the jury does not necessarily protect the defendant or the
plaintiff. Rather, the jury ensures that each litigant is afforded a trial
that is free from excessive government influence and, specifically, free
from the influence of biased judges.30
24
See Solomon, supra note 19, at 1341 (“[T]he civil jury was recognized as a necessary
safeguard . . . against the government . . . .”).
25
See id. (noting how civil juries “protect[ed] citizens from oppressive laws”).
26
See Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 33 (1994)
(“[M]eaningful representation, accountable deliberation, and communication [are] necessary characteristics of socially just, collective decision-making.”). But see Solomon, supra
note 19, at 1342 (“If we do still need civil juries as checks on judges, it is not clear how
exactly this check quite works.”).
27
See Michael D. Green, The Impact of the Civil Jury on American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 337, 341 (2011) (“[T]here are numerous, prominent aspects of the contemporary
torts scene that are influenced by, or simply the result of, the existence of the civil jury.”);
see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 277–79 (discussing how civil juries interpret the
reasonable person standard differently for individuals and corporations).
28
See James Joseph Duane, Jurors’ Handbook: A Citizens Guide to Jury Duty, FULLY
INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION (1996), http://www.fija.org/docs/JG_Jurors_Handbook.pdf
(“That is the power of the jury at work; the power to decide the issues of law under which
the defendant is charged, as well as the facts.”).
29
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding “that the statute of
West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes because
of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man
when he is put upon trial for an alleged offence against the State”).
30
See Haddon, supra note 26, at 90–91 (arguing “representativeness in participation
can respond to the problem of unchecked power by the judge . . . by making better use of
the social and intellectual processes by which individuals and groups engage in meaningful
exchange of ideas, deliberate, and achieve consensus”). Moreover, the jury checks the
power of the government by checking the power of majority groups within society who are
presumably more powerful. See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 962–63 (“A representative jury makes deliberation impartial, precisely by checking the biases of any one group,
and by giving power to arguments that bridge the divides of demography in America and
move diverse people to the same verdict.”). Similarly, in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978), the Supreme Court held that a five-person jury violated the Sixth Amendment.
The Court’s reasoning was based on empirical studies demonstrating that the quality of
deliberation decreased as the size of the jury decreased. Id. at 232–39. Thus, a jury too
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B. Encouraging Civic Participation
A second function of the jury is to advance civic ideals and participation. In contrast to the jury’s role as a check on government power,
which protects litigants, the civic function of the jury protects potential jurors. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that jury service is “one of the
most efficacious means for the education of the people which society
can employ.”31 But it is not merely that jury service educates citizens;
jury service is an avenue through which citizens partake in democracy.
The right to serve on a jury may be viewed as akin to the right to
vote.32 Excluding certain groups from jury service undermines the
bonds of those groups with other democratic institutions. As John
Gastil et al. argue, “members of a democratic society need to connect
not just with each other but also with the state in ways that are inspiring, empowering, educational, and habit forming.”33 Jury service is an
important means to create that connection. Again, de Tocqueville
recognized as much when he wrote:
The jury . . . invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
society; and the part which they take in the Government. By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs which are not exclusively
their own, it rubs off that individual egotism which is the rust of
society.34

The Supreme Court has also recognized the right of jurors to
have the opportunity to serve. In Powers v. Ohio, the Court explained
that “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded
from one on account of race.”35
small to adequately deliberate denies a litigant of her right to a fair trial. See id. at 241–42.
The argument made by Georgia as to why it used five-person juries in certain cases was that
small juries saved the state money. Id. at 243–44. The Court rejected that reason as not
strong enough to overcome the litigant’s right to adequate deliberative capacity by the
jury. Id. at 244. Therefore, the jury’s function as a check on government power is not
merely to buttress the government’s nefarious policies but also to protect against more
neutral policies that effectively deprive a litigant of her jury right. Compare Haddon, supra
note 26, at 90–91 (addressing abuse of power by judges), with Rose & Abramson, supra note
12, at 962–63 (addressing possible majority bias within unrepresentative juries), and Ballew,
435 U.S. at 245 (ruling that reducing jury size to five members is a deprivation of litigants’
right to fair trials).
31
GASTIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 337 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken Books 1974) (1835)).
32
See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 205 (1995) (“[T]he plain meaning of various constitutional provisions concerning the ‘right to vote’ literally applies to jurors.”).
33
GASTIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 9.
34
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (quoting 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
31, at 334–37).
35
Id. at 409.

R
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C. Providing Legitimacy to the Legal System
A third function of the jury is to add legitimacy to the legal system. While the first two functions protect individuals (both litigants
and potential jurors), the legitimacy function of the jury protects
society at large by bolstering public confidence in legal outcomes.36
Although there are certainly specific instances where a particular jury
verdict is controversial,37 opinion polls confirm that the American
public has greater confidence in a jury’s verdict than a judge’s
verdict.38
There are numerous ways in which a jury injects legitimacy into
the legal system.39 People may trust a jury’s verdict more than a
judge’s verdict for a host of reasons. It may be that people trust verdicts rendered by lay jurors more than those rendered by legal professionals employed by the state (i.e., judges) because of a deep-seated
distrust of government.40 It may be that people prefer to have twelve
individuals deliberate, rather than one judge decide.41 Or it may be
that juries accord with our notion of democracy.42
Regardless of the mechanism by which juries legitimize legal outcomes, perceptions of fairness in the legal system are correlated to
perceptions that the jury is impartial. Leslie Ellis and Shari Diamond
studied the effect of jury composition on perceptions of fairness in
36
See Haddon, supra note 26, at 53 (“The jury has been said to forge public acceptance of court decisions by legitimizing them.”). The jury might also inject legitimacy into
the legal system by its “transitory nature.” Id. This reasoning suggests that because a jury is
not permanent, when it reaches an unpopular verdict, public ire is deflected away from the
court and toward the jury. In other words, the jury can insulate the judge from making
difficult decisions. Id.
37
See Frank Newport, Blacks, Nonblacks Hold Sharply Different Views of Martin Case, GALLUP (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153776/blacks-nonblacks-hold-sharplydifferent-views-martin-case.aspx (highlighting the different perspectives of blacks and nonblacks on the jury verdict over George Zimmerman).
38
58% Still Trust A Jury’s Verdict More Than A Judge’s, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Feb. 19,
2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/feb
ruary_2014/58_still_trust_a_jury_s_verdict_more_than_a_judge_s (“The latest Rasmussen
Reports national telephone survey finds that 58% of American Adults trust a jury more to
determine the guilt or innocence of someone accused of criminal behavior. Just 22% trust
a judge more, while nearly as many (20%) are not sure.”).
39
See Solomon, supra note 19, at 1353 (“[T]he most pervasive theme in justifying the
civil jury is that it provides democratic legitimacy. How exactly this argument works,
though, is often unclear . . . .”).
40
Chief Justice William Howard Taft recognized this function of the jury when he
wrote, “One of [the jury system’s] greatest benefits is in the security it gives the people that
they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of the country can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.” Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922).
41
See Haddon, supra note 26, at 53 (“[B]ecause the jury verdict is seen as the product
of the group, and thus the legitimacy of the result is supported in a manner that might not
be attainable if one person, the judge, decides.”).
42
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law . . . .”).
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verdicts. They found that guilty verdicts rendered by heterogeneous
juries were more likely to be viewed as fair than guilty verdicts rendered by homogenous (i.e., all white) juries.43 Accordingly, “cost[s]
can arise if juries fail to reflect a fair cross-section of the community.
Regardless of any direct effects on verdict, unrepresentative juries potentially threaten the public’s faith in the legitimacy of the legal system and its outcomes.”44
Judges have also noted the legitimacy functions of the jury. In
Ballard v. United States, Justice Douglas indicated his concern about the
effect of nonrepresentative juries when he said, “[t]he injury is not
limited to the defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law
as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic
ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.”45 Many have echoed
Justice Douglas’s words over the years.46
II
THE FAIR CROSS SECTION GUARANTEE
The fair cross section right guarantees that jury venires will be
representative of the community in which a case will be tried. It is a
derivative of the constitutional command that the jury be “impar43
Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering
and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1049 (2003); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 707 (1995) (noting the mistrust in
communities where juries are regularly composed of all white jurors).
44
Ellis & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1038. The legitimizing function of a jury drawn
from a representative cross section of the community was recognized long before Smith v.
Texas started to open the door of the cross-sectional ideal by holding that “the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits . . . racial discrimination in the selection of grand juries.” Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940). The early practice of utilizing mixed juries when adjudicating cases involving minority groups served a legitimizing function. Regarding the use of
mixed juries by American colonists in cases with Native American litigants, Neil Vidmar
and Valerie P. Hans state, “[T]he colonists had the insight that the mixed-jury verdict
would be viewed as more legitimate by the Native American population.” VIDMAR & HANS,
supra note 2, at 69–70.
45
329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); see also McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballard while noting that the effect of excluding minorities from the jury “goes beyond the individual defendant” and harms the legitimacy of the
jury system, the law, the community, and the democratic ideal).
46
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror
to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”
(citing Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195)). Politicians have also relied on Justice Douglas’s words.
Senator Joseph Tyding, the chief architect of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
(JSSA), opened the hearings that would eventually lead to the JSSA’s enactment by citing
Ballard. See Federal Jury Selection: Hearing on S. 383, S. 384, S. 385, S.386, S.387, S. 989, and S.
1319 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 1 (1967) (statement of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.).

R
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tial.”47 As such, the fair cross section right promotes the functions of
the jury: it protects litigants from government overreach; it serves a
civic function by ensuring that potential jurors are not arbitrarily precluded from jury service; and it helps preserve the legitimacy of the
jury and the legal system.
A. The Rise of the Fair Cross Section Ideal
The concept that a jury should be drawn from a fair cross section
of the community is a relatively recent development.48 In its early
forms, juries were certainly not representative bodies.49 In the American colonies, juries may have been slightly more egalitarian than their
English counterparts, but early American juries were a far cry from
representing a fair cross section of the community.50 Throughout the
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, American juries continued to be all male, mostly white, and comprised of
“respected” members of the community.51
The rise of a cross-sectional ideal began to take hold in the midtwentieth century.52 In 1940, the Supreme Court suggested that juries
should be “representative of the community.”53 For the next two
decades, judges and scholars debated the merits of representative juries. With the growing influence of the civil rights movement in the
1960s, the side favoring representative juries gained the upper hand.
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit struck down a jury-selection procedure that
included good character and intelligence qualification requirements,
which had the effect of excluding a disproportionate number of
African Americans from jury service in Georgia.54 United States v.
Rabinowitz highlighted gaps in the then-existing statutory scheme for
selecting jurors in the federal courts. As a result, Congress intervened
with the passage of the Jury Service and Selection Act of 1968
(JSSA).55 With the enactment of the JSSA, Congress declared that
47
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (“Our inquiry is whether the presence of a fair cross section of the community on venires, panels, or lists from which petit
juries are drawn is essential to the fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an
impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions.”).
48
ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 99.
49
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 2, at 34 (describing the difficulty of “assembling an
unbiased jury of peers” in early juries).
50
Id. at 66.
51
Id. at 66–67. An exception was the limited use of mixed juries, which placed members of minority groups on juries when a member of that group faced trial. The use of
mixed juries served to legitimize verdicts, particularly when Native Americans were on trial.
Id. at 70.
52
See ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 99–100 (highlighting how the cross-sectional jury
was further promulgated in the 1960s and 1970s).
53
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
54
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 44 (5th Cir. 1966).
55
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (2013).
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“[i]t is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit
juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community
in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”56
In addition to the statutory fair cross section guarantee, courts
have employed the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
to address discrimination in assembling jury venires.57 But while
equal protection is a powerful tool to combat intentional discrimination in drafting the jury venire, it is less effective in addressing situations where there is obvious underrepresentation of certain segments
of the community on jury venires but no evidence of intentional exclusion on the part of state actors.58
In response to the inadequacy of the Equal Protection Clause to
protect the impartiality of the potential jury, the Supreme Court
breathed life into the Sixth Amendment in Taylor v. Louisiana59 by
making it a tool to address unintentional underrepresentation in jury
venires. In 1975, the Taylor Court gave the cross-sectional ideal constitutional status when it declared, “the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”60 By acknowledging that the Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury requirement required
cross-sectional representation on jury venires, the Court opened the
door to allow challenges to the composition of jury venires even where
there is no evidence of intentional discrimination.
B. The Function of the Fair Cross Section Guarantee
As noted above, the jury serves three essential functions: (1)
checking government power; (2) encouraging civic participation; and
(3) providing legitimacy for legal outcomes.61 The requirement that
jury venires are drawn from a fair cross section of the community
should promote these functions. Indeed, in Taylor, the Court was
“convinced that the [fair cross section] requirement has solid foundation” because it promotes the three major functions of the jury:
(1) “to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against
56

28 U.S.C. § 1861.
See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair CrossSection Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 151–52 (2012)
(“African-Americans were recognized as part of the community for jury purposes only with
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 . . . .”).
58
See id. at 152–53 (explaining a possible root of the judicial confusion between the
intentional and systematic exclusion standards).
59
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
60
Id. at 528.
61
See supra Part I.
57
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the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge”;
(2) to support “[c]ommunity participation in the administration of
the criminal law”; and (3) to promote “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”62
In regard to serving as a check on government power, the fair
cross section requirement prevents government officials from hand
selecting jurors. Indeed, Congress passed the JSSA in response to dissatisfaction with the arbitrary and proprietary selection of jurors by
court clerks.63 To encourage civic participation, the fair cross section
requirement ensures that no group is systematically excluded from
the opportunity to serve on a jury and thus deprived of the civic benefits of jury service, regardless of whether the exclusion is intentional
or unintentional.64 Finally, in regard to legitimacy, drawing the jury
venire from a fair cross section of the community reassures the public
that the trial is not rigged against any particular defendant,65 and it
also makes it more likely that actual juries will be diverse.66
C. The Duren Test
Four years after Taylor, the Supreme Court developed a test for
determining whether there is a fair cross section violation.67 In Duren
v. Missouri, the Court considered whether Missouri’s practice of providing a procedure for women to opt out of jury service constituted
systematic exclusion in violation of the fair cross section requirement
of the Sixth Amendment.68 The Court took note of the fact that
women averaged less than fifteen percent of participants on jury
venires in the forum county.69 Such disproportionate representation,
62

419 U.S. at 530.
The JSSA was, in part, a response to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rabinowitz v.
United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). Alexander E. Preller, Jury Duty is a Poll Tax: The
Case for Severing the Link Between Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 1, 4 (2012).
64
See supra Part I.B (discussing how the jury system encourages civic participation); see
also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (noting that systematic underrepresentation
of any one group is evidence that the jury is not a fair cross section of the community).
65
See Rabinowitz, 366 F.2d at 59–60 (1966) (“Even more important is the fact that
many citizens will have no direct contact with the administration of justice, but will judge
its efficacy on how the judicial process functions . . . . ‘[T]here is injury to the jury system,
to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.’ When the basic jury list was poisoned, the fruits of
that list were also infected.” (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946))).
66
ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 101 (drawing the jury venire from a cross section ensures that the jury “represent[s] accurately the diversity of views held in a heterogeneous
society such as the United States”).
67
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
68
Id. at 359–60.
69
Id. at 360, 365–66.
63

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN204.txt

474

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

12-JAN-15

14:50

[Vol. 100:463

according to the Court, violated the fair cross section requirement.70
In so holding, the Duren Court outlined a three-part test for fair cross
section challenges:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged
to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process.71

Missouri’s reasons for its jury-selection procedure were not irrelevant, according to the Supreme Court.72 Although Missouri failed to
offer a sufficient justification for its procedure,73 the Court considered
the potential justification that a state might want to ensure that jury
service did not infringe upon the “preclusive domestic responsibilities
of some women.”74 While the Court rejected that potential justification, it left the door open to allowing procedures that may inadequately compile a representative jury venire if the procedure is
appropriately tailored to support an important state interest.75
After Duren, the fact that a distinctive group is unreasonably and
systematically underrepresented on jury venires satisfies the defendant’s prima facie case for a fair cross section violation.76 The state
can overcome a fair cross section challenge by demonstrating a compelling reason for exclusion and that its procedures are appropriately
tailored to support the state interest.77 In other words, once the defendant satisfies the three elements of the Duren test, the burden shifts
to the state to justify its practice.78

70

Id. at 360.
Id. at 364.
72
See id. at 368–69 (“[O]nce the defendant has made a prima facie showing of an
infringement of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community, it is the State that bears the burden of justifying this infringement by showing
attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.”).
73
Id. at 369.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 370 (“[A] State may have an important interest in assuring that those members of the family responsible for the care of children are available to do so. An exemption
appropriately tailored to this interest would . . . survive a fair-cross-section challenge.”).
76
See id. at 364; see also Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that, “[u]nder the test established by Duren,” disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group must be systematic to violate the Sixth Amendment trial by jury right).
77
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 370.
78
Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 916 (“If these three are proved, the burden
shifts to the state to defend the practices.” (citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 367–68)).
71

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN204.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 13

AN (UN)FAIR CROSS SECTION

12-JAN-15

14:50

475

D. Duren’s Systematic Exclusion Requirement
As noted above, the third prong of the Duren test requires
“that . . . underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury-selection process.”79 What constitutes systematic
exclusion of a distinctive group? On the facts of Duren, the Supreme
Court held that Missouri’s practice of allowing women to voluntarily
opt out of jury service satisfied the meaning of systematic exclusion.80
Such a practice was systematic because “[the] large discrepancy [in
female representation on jury venires] occurred not just occasionally,
but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year.”81 Thus, the
practice “manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic—that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection
process utilized.”82 In summary, the Duren Court did not need to engage in an extensive inquiry to determine that the jury-selection procedure led to systematic underrepresentation; it was apparent that the
opt-out provision was the culprit. What Duren did not say was that a
defendant needed to show with particularity how the jury-selection
procedure caused the underrepresentation in order to make out a
prima facie case for a fair cross section violation.83
E. Courts’ Applications of Systematic Exclusion in
the Duren Test
Despite the Duren Court not requiring defendants to show a specific mechanism of the underrepresentation, courts have strictly construed the third prong of the Duren test. For example, state courts of
appeals have required that defendants demonstrate how a juryselection procedure causes the systematic exclusion of distinctive
groups from jury venires.84 Unlike in Duren, where the Court assumed
79

Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 366–67.
81
Id. at 366.
82
Id.
83
See Chernoff, supra note 57, at 162–63 (observing that “disparity over time can
alone” prove something systemic caused the disparity and noting that the Duren Court
ruled in Duren’s favor even though he could not prove “with particularity” when “the systematic exclusion [of women] took place” in the selection process (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
84
Although the Supreme Court did not need to reach the third prong of the Duren
test in Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (reviewing a Michigan Supreme Court decision that the Sixth Circuit believed was incorrect), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg addressed
the systematic exclusion requirement. She noted that “[n]o ‘clearly established’ precedent
of this Court supports Smith’s claim that he can make out a prima facie case [for systematic
exclusion] merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in combination,
might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation.” Id. at 332. As such, the Supreme
Court seems to adopt an interpretation of Duren that requires the defendant to show that
the underrepresentation is caused by the jury-selection system. See also Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (“[O]ur cases hold that the Sixth Amendment entitles every
80
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that Missouri’s opt-out provision was responsible for the underrepresentation of women, some courts require that defendants affirmatively show how a jury-selection procedure contributes to the
underrepresentation of a distinctive group.85
Moreover, federal courts of appeals have consistently said that a
showing of persistent underrepresentation is insufficient to prove causation.86 As the Ninth Circuit said, “[i]f underrepresentation by itself
were sufficient to support a holding of unconstitutionality, the second
and third prong of Duren would effectively collapse into one inquiry.”87 And the Sixth Circuit noted in a recent application of Duren,
“[g]enerally speaking, a long-standing statistical disparity is not
enough to establish systematic exclusion.”88 In Bates v. United States,
the Sixth Circuit rejected a fair cross section challenge because it
found “nothing in the record indicating that the racial disparity at
issue [which the court conceded occurred consistently over time] was
caused by the . . . jury selection procedures.”89 The problem is that
requiring this showing of causation permits courts to reject fair cross
section challenges even when the underrepresentation of a distinctive
group is due to the jury-selection procedure.
There are three ways in which courts apply this stringent causation standard to the third prong of the Duren test. First, some courts
require a showing of intent in order for a defendant to succeed in a
fair cross section challenge.90 Second, some courts reject fair cross
section challenges on the grounds that excluded individuals from a
defendant to object to a venire that is not designed to represent a fair cross section of the
community . . . .” (emphasis added)).
85
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 951 (noting that a fair cross section challenge failed in United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005), because the “defense evidence could not pinpoint how much of the underrepresentation of African
Americans was due to these systematic flaws, as opposed to the more practical problems
that do not stem from state action”).
86
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 463 F. App’x 564, 571 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Defendant
points to nothing in the selection process that allows an inference that any underrepresentation was due to the system itself.” (emphasis added)); Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F.
App’x 395, 403 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[The defendant] has not shown that any underrepresentation of Hispanics or persons 18 to 34 on his jury venire was due to their ‘systematic exclusion in [the] jury-selection process.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
Rose and Abramson argue that lower courts’ rejections of fair cross section challenges in
the face of evidence that distinctive groups are consistently underrepresented results from
courts “conflating two distinct principles. One is the requirement that jurors be chosen in
nondiscriminatory ways; the other is that jurors are to be chosen from a pool that is a
representative or fair cross-section of the community.” Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at
914.
87
Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004).
88
Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2012).
89
Id. at 451 (emphasis added). The Bates court acknowledged that an extreme disparity that persisted over time may be considered a per se fair cross section violation. Id. at
450.
90
See infra Part II.E.1.
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distinctive group self-select out of jury service.91 Finally, some courts
reject fair cross section challenges where a jury commission uses a presumptively valid list, such as voter-registration lists, despite evidence
that the list is not representative of the community.92 In all these
cases, the jury-selection procedures contribute to underrepresentation. Courts, however, reject the fair cross section challenge because
other factors may also contribute to underrepresentation. Thus, the
defendant is not able to show exactly how the jury-selection procedure
causes underrepresentation and, therefore, not able to satisfy a strict
reading of the third prong of the Duren test.
1. Intent
The most egregious error that courts make in applying the Duren
test is confusing the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.93 In Duren, the Supreme Court stated that satisfying the third
prong of the test requires only that the exclusion is systematic or inherent to the procedures for forming the jury venire.94 Thus, procedures that regularly lead to nonrepresentative jury venires violate the
fair cross section guarantee regardless of whether or not the state intends to exclude distinctive groups.
Despite Duren, Nina Chernoff demonstrated that some courts of
appeals’ decisions require that the jury-selection practice intentionally
discriminate against a distinctive group for a fair cross section challenge to succeed. Chernoff examined 167 federal courts of appeals
cases that cited Duren from January 1, 2000, to July 30, 2011.95 According to her review, of the 167 fair cross section challenges, 104 were
denied because a court held that the defendant failed to satisfy the
third prong of Duren.96 And of those 104 cases, 43 were rejected because the defendant failed to allege or show that the exclusion was
intentional or discriminatory.97 For instance, the Ninth Circuit dis91

See infra Part II.E.2.
See infra Part II.E.3.
93
See Chernoff, supra note 57, at 192–94 (arguing that failing to differentiate between
the two tests “threatens both the integrity of the law and public acceptance of judicial
decisions”).
94
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
95
Chernoff, supra note 57, at 166 n.122 (detailing the author’s methodology and accounting for limitations).
96
Id. at 166 (reporting author’s statistical findings).
97
See id. at 166–68, nn.128–37 (citing cases). Chernoff attributes this commingling of
the Sixth Amendment fair cross section right and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee to the historical development of the fair cross section right. Id. at 193.
Prior to 1975, when the fair cross section right was established in Taylor v. Louisiana, courts
dealt with fair cross section challenges as equal protection violations. Id. at 150. Thus, that
legacy persists today in some courts and leads some judges to require purposeful discrimination in the Sixth Amendment context. Id. at 193–94.
92

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-2\CRN204.txt

478

unknown

Seq: 16

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

12-JAN-15

14:50

[Vol. 100:463

missed a fair cross section challenge on the grounds that the defendant failed to make out “a prima facie case for discrimination . . . .”98
In these cases, courts permit jury venires that are not representative of
a fair cross section of the community, regardless of whether or not the
jury procedure caused the underrepresentation. So long as the court
finds that the jury commission was not intentionally discriminatory,
there is no violation.
2. Self-Exclusion
For courts that correctly recognize that intent to exclude a distinctive group is not an element of the Duren test, many still reject fair
cross section challenges when they find that the reason for a group’s
underrepresentation was because members of the group “self select”
out of jury duty.99 What is striking about this reasoning is that it directly contradicts Duren, which considered a provision allowing
women to self-select out of jury service.100 Courts that apply this reasoning distinguish Duren by noting that the opt-out provision in Duren
was explicitly contemplated by the jury-selection procedure at issue.
As the Tenth Circuit has said, “[d]iscrepancies resulting from the private choices of potential jurors do not represent the kind of constitutional infirmity contemplated by Duren.”101 And in United States v.
Carter, the Sixth Circuit rejected a fair cross section challenge despite
evidence that there was a pattern of underrepresentation of African
Americans on jury venires because, according to the court, “[t]he district court [was] under no obligation to compel no-shows.”102 Failure
to show up for jury service, in the court’s view, was the fault of the
potential jurors for which the district should not be responsible.
While the facts of Duren may be distinguishable, requiring an explicit procedure for citizens to opt out of jury service as a prerequisite
for a fair cross section violation does not logically follow from the reasoning of Duren. The failure to enact procedures that encourage jury
participation can also stand in the way of representative jury venires.
The Fifth Circuit rejected a fair cross section challenge based on
claims regarding the district’s low pay for jury service and the district’s
lack of effort to compel potential jurors to respond to summonses because those practices did “not constitute the type of affirmative barrier
to selection for jury service that is the hallmark of a Sixth Amendment
98

United States v. Hara, 237 F. App’x 263, 265 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
Chernoff, supra note 57, at 178 (noting that “courts emphasize the ‘private choices’
of putative jurors to ‘willfully exclude themselves’ from the jury pool”).
100
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 369–70 (“[E]xempting all women because of the preclusive
domestic responsibilities of some women is insufficient justification for their disproportionate exclusion on jury venires.”).
101
United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2006).
102
483 F. App’x 70, 74 (6th Cir. 2012).
99
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violation.”103 But while the potential juror may be partly to blame, it
cannot be credibly argued that a jury-selection policy regarding pay or
enforcement of summonses does not have an impact on the likelihood that certain groups, particularly the young and minorities, will
show up for jury service.
3. Presumptively Valid Lists
Courts also reject fair cross section challenges when a state or
district selects jurors by using a presumptively valid list, such as a voterregistration list, despite evidence that certain groups are underrepresented on such lists. Courts hold that jury commissions are not
responsible for the fact that certain groups register to vote in lower
proportion to their representation in the community.104 The Eighth
Circuit has held that in order to prove a fair cross section violation the
defendant must show not only that a distinctive group has registered
to vote in lower numbers than that group’s proportion in the community but also that the group “faced obstacles to voting.”105 The Fifth
and Tenth Circuits are of the opinion that the circuits are in “complete agreement that neither the [JSSA] nor the Constitution require
that a supplemental source of names be added to voter lists simply
because an identifiable group votes in a proportion lower than the
rest of the population.”106 However, one cannot credibly argue that
the use of an inadequate list does not cause underrepresentation of
certain groups.107
F. Understanding the Third Prong of the Duren Test in Context
Rejecting fair cross section challenges because the defendant cannot show that the government intended to exclude certain groups,
that potential jurors did not self-select out of jury service, or that the
list used was not prejudicial, is inconsistent with the reasoning in
Duren. In particular, Duren instructs that when distinctive groups are
103

Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 395, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 691 F.3d 841, 850–51 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
the argument that the exclusive use of voter-registration lists can violate the fair cross section right despite systemic underrepresentation of certain distinctive groups on voterregistration lists); United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1272 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersons
holding a driver’s license but choosing not to vote simply do not comprise a distinct
group.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
defendant’s attempt to “link[ ] sole reliance on voter-registration lists for jury selection to
current systematic exclusion of Hispanics”).
105
United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 790 (8th Cir. 2009).
106
Orange, 447 F.3d at 800 (quoting United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 586 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1976) (citing cases)).
107
To argue otherwise would be nonsensical. A jury-selection procedure that utilizes
lists that do not include an individual’s name is a reason why that individual is not called
for jury duty. Likewise, lists that omit large proportions of citizens of certain distinctive
groups are a reason why that group is underrepresented on jury venires.
104
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underrepresented on jury venires over a period of time, the juryselection procedure is inherently flawed.108 And when one examines
the elements of the Duren test and considers the work that each prong
of the test accomplishes, it is clear that the third prong does not require the strict reading that courts of appeals demand.
The Duren test’s first prong—identifying a distinctive group—
helps distinguish the characteristics that are relevant to constituting a
jury venire that is representative of the community.109 For example,
courts have determined that some characteristics, like gender and
race, deserve proportional representation on jury venires.110 For
other characteristics, such as sexual orientation, is it less clear whether
jury venires must proportionally represent individuals sharing the
characteristic.111 And courts have rejected the idea that individuals
sharing other characteristics, such as being a resident of public housing112 or having a need to urinate frequently,113 must be proportionately represented on jury venires. However imperfectly the first prong
of the Duren test does its work, its purpose is to distinguish characteristics deserving of proportional representation on jury venires and
those that do not.
The second prong of the Duren test distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable levels of deviation for the representation of a
distinctive group on a jury venire from their representation in the
community.114 Different courts have used different approaches to determine what is acceptable deviation.115 For example, the Eleventh
Circuit is steadfast in its use of the “absolute disparity” test and that
there is no violation of the second prong of the Duren test unless the
disparity exceeds ten percent.116 The Supreme Court, in its most re108

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
See id. at 364.
110
See, e.g., id. (gender); United States v. Wagner, 41 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (race).
111
See Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x 20, 27 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 391 (2013), and reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 814 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
never held that homosexuality is a protected class for purposes of analyzing discrimination
in jury selection under Batson.”). But see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740
F.3d 471, 444 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that peremptory challenges made on the basis of
sexual orientation must be subjected to heightened scrutiny).
112
See United States v. González-Vélez, 466 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no
case law supporting the argument that public housing residents are a distinctive group.”).
113
See United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that
defendants “provide no supporting authority [and] provide no statistical data” to the claim
that individuals who need to urinate frequently are a distinct class).
114
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
115
See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010) (identifying three methods employed in lower federal court decisions “to measure the representation of distinctive
groups in jury pools”: absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation).
116
United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under black
letter Eleventh Circuit precedent, ‘[i]f the absolute disparity . . . is ten percent or less, the
109
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cent fair cross section decision, refused to adopt or require one
method over another.117 Despite this ambiguity, the purpose of the
various measurements for Duren’s second prong is to distinguish between significant and insignificant deviations from proportionality.
The second prong relieves courts from the impossibility of having to
compose jury pools that are exactly proportional to the community.118
The third prong of the Duren test—the systematic exclusion
prong—distinguishes between situations where a particular jury venire is nonrepresentative and those situations where the jury venires
in a district are continuously nonrepresentative of the community.119
A defendant does not have a right to a particular jury,120 nor does a
defendant have the right to a particular jury venire.121 Rather, the
right is to a process that is fair—that is, one that is not predisposed to
stacking the deck against the defendant.122 As such, the third prong
of the Duren test ensures that a particular nonrepresentative jury venire is not a statistical anomaly, but rather that there is a repeated
pattern of exclusion of certain groups within a jurisdiction.
If there is a pattern of underrepresentation of certain groups on
jury venires, it stands to reason that some aspect of the jury-selection
procedure is causing that underrepresentation.123 Indeed, the Duren
Court concluded “that a large discrepancy occur[ing] not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was
systematic—that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process
second element is not satisfied . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (11th Cir. 1995))).
117
See Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329–30 (“[W]e would have no cause to take sides today on
the method or methods by which underrepresentation is appropriately measured.”).
118
Indeed, a requirement of exact proportionality would be unworkable, particularly
because courts and litigants do not always agree about the make-up of the community. See,
e.g., Mares v. Scribner, 389 F. App’x 738, 739-40 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the argument
that the use of 1990 census data was insufficient to measure community representation).
119
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
120
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“It should also be emphasized
that in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the
community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are
not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” (internal citations omitted)).
121
See, e.g., United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 434 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We note that a
defendant cannot establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement by
relying solely on the composition of the jury panel at his own trial.”).
122
See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
123
See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (“The resulting disproportionate and consistent
exclusion of women from the jury wheel . . . was quite obviously due to the system by which
juries were selected.”).
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utilized.”124 Moreover, when a distinctive group is underrepresented
on the jury for a considerable period of time, it is very likely that the
jury-selection procedure does, in some way, cause the underrepresentation. While a jury-selection procedure may not be the sole
reasons for the underrepresentation of a group, it certainly plays a
role.125
G. Summary of the Duren Test’s Application
In summary, in applying the Duren test, courts of appeals adhere
to a strict reading of the third prong of the test. Courts require that
defendants demonstrate that the jury-selection procedure causes underrepresentation of a distinctive group on jury venires.126 When
there are other potential factors, such as when citizens do not respond
to summonses or fail to register to vote, courts reject fair cross section
challenges because the defendant is unable to draw a clear causal link
between the jury-selection procedure and the underrepresentation.127
Duren says nothing, however, about requiring the defendant to
demonstrate the mechanism by which the jury-selection procedure
leads to underrepresentation.128 This should be apparent when con124
Id. at 366; see also Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2012)
(conceding that “an extreme underrepresentation may be enough to establish a per se systematic exclusion”); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 586 (10th Cir. 1976) (“[P]roof
that a cognizable group had been totally excluded from jury service over a substantial period of time or had received only ‘token representation’ has been held sufficient to raise
an inference of discrimination and systematic exclusion.”).
125
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 952 (“It may be that too high a burden . . . imposed on a defense to require it to untangle the various factors that lead a jury
plan consistently over a number of years to fairly recruit minority jurors. It should be
enough to establish, as the data in Green did, the cumulative effect of these factors in diluting minority representation.” (citing United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass.
2005))).
126
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014)
(requiring evidence that underrepresentation of African Americans and Hispanics in the
jury pool “is due to the system employed by the [district court]”); United States v. Weaver,
267 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring the defendant to “demonstrate . . . the underrepresentation [of African Americans and Hispanics] is caused by the ‘systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury selection process’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Cecil, 836
F.2d 1431, 1446 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the defendant must show that the procedure
of using voter-registration lists systematically or intentionally excludes); United States v.
Lynch, 792 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that underrepresentation of young adults
in a grand jury requires “evidence of actual discriminatory or exclusionary practices” in
order to violate the Sixth Amendment); Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 241 (11th Cir.
1982) (requiring the underrepresentation of women to be established through “their systematic exclusion in [the state’s] jury selection procedure”).
127
See, e.g., Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 685 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[B]ecause the underrepresentation . . . was not a result of systematic exclusion, Ford’s petit jury challenge
fails.”); Atwell v. Blackburn, 800 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Because Atwell has not
established that the failure to serve jury duty summonses . . . caused residents . . . to be
underrepresented on his grand jury venire, we find that his claim . . . must fail.”).
128
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 366–67.
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sidering the work that each prong of the test accomplishes. In particular, the purpose of the third prong of the Duren test is to ensure that
a particular nonrepresentative venire is not an anomaly, but rather
that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group is persistent.129
Therefore, it should be enough for the defendant raising a fair
cross section challenge to demonstrate that there is a pattern of unreasonable underrepresentation of distinctive groups.130 Requiring a
defendant to show exactly how that jury-selection process contributes
to the systematic underrepresentation adds an additional hurdle for
defendants making fair cross section challenges.131 As a result, fair
cross section challenges are doomed to fail, and do fail, in nearly every
instance.132

HOW

THE

III
APPLICATION OF THE DUREN TEST UNDERMINES
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY

The functions of the jury are undermined by the fact that defendants regularly lose fair cross section challenges despite demonstrating
that there is a pattern of a distinctive group being underrepresented
in jury venires.133 In these cases, courts essentially endorse juryselection procedures that fail to live up to the cross-sectional ideal.
This, in turn, undermines the ability of the fair cross section guarantee to support the jury in (1) checking government power, (2) encouraging civic participation, and (3) bolstering the legitimacy of
legal outcomes.

129
See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 330 (2010) (describing the “issue ultimately
dispositive in Duren” as the extent to which underrepresentation was due to systematic
exclusion).
130
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 952 (“It should be enough to establish . . . the cumulative effect of [various] factors in diluting minority representation.”).
131
Id. at 954 (“[T]he presence of a complicated mix [of factors] leads to the legal
conclusion that courts need do little or nothing.”).
132
See Chernoff, supra note 57, at 145 (“When defendants claim that their jury was
selected in violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right . . . their claims are
usually denied.”); Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 952 (“It may be that too high a
burden is being imposed on a defense to require it to untangle the various factors that lead
a jury plan consistently over a number of years to fairly recruit minority jurors.”).
133
See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 450–51 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
a fair cross section challenge despite “statistical evidence indicat[ing] that African-Americans have been consistently underrepresented in . . . jury venires”); Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F.
App’x 395, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a fair cross section challenge despite the fact
that the percentage of Hispanics and young adults who appeared for jury service “[were]
significantly less than the percentage of such individuals” in the community).
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A. Check on Government Power
As noted earlier, no defendant is entitled to a particular jury or a
particular jury venire.134 Rather, defendants are entitled to a fair
process.135 A defendant may find himself with an all-white jury, drawn
from an all-white jury venire,136 but that alone does not rise to the
level of a fair cross section violation. To satisfy Duren, the defendant
must, at a minimum, show that there is a long-standing pattern of underrepresentation of distinctive groups on jury venires.137 While this
may lead to the perception that an individual defendant receives no
protection from the fair cross section guarantee, the fair cross section
guarantee does protect defendants from arbitrary abuses of government power.138 The Sixth Amendment ensures that the jury venire is
not intentionally or unintentionally stacked against the defendant.139
The Sixth Amendment, working in conjunction with the Fourteenth
Amendment, gives a defendant a fair shot at an impartial jury.140
Unfortunately, the courts’ application of Duren undercuts this
function of the jury. By requiring that defendants show how the juryselection procedure causes underrepresentation, the government can
employ inadequate jury-selection procedures that prejudice certain
defendants. Mary Rose and Jeffrey Abramson recount how the
District of Massachusetts’ jury-selection procedures in United States v.
Green141 contributed to the prosecutors’ decision to bring charges in
federal court.142 In that case, bringing the case in the federal court
greatly decreased the percentage of African Americans eligible for the
jury pool.143 As a result, “[i]n the years immediately preceding the
Green indictments, the proportion of African Americans in the availa134

See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
136
See United States v. Tripp, 370 F. App’x 753, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
defendant’s fair cross section claim that was based on “the district court . . . denying his
motion to strike the all-white jury venire and . . . violat[ing] his constitutional right to a fair
trial”).
137
See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366–67 (1979) (establishing that petitioner
met systematic exclusion requirement through “[h]is undisputed demonstration that a
large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of
nearly a year”); Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 939 (“But the Sixth Amendment does
not require a defendant to prove an official intent to discriminate; it is sufficient to show
that an otherwise neutral jury plan works in practice over a number of years to the disadvantage of minorities.”).
138
See Chernoff, supra note 57, at 186 (noting that the right to have a fair cross section
of the community represented at the jury venire “belongs . . . to the defendant”).
139
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 939.
140
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 359.
141
389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005).
142
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 946–47.
143
See id. at 947–48 (noting that the percentage of available African American jurors
in the Eastern Division of the Federal District of Massachusetts was much less than the
county where the crime occurred).
135
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ble jury pools averaged . . . less than half the expected representation
indicated through U.S. Census data.”144
Despite the obvious connection between the lists and the persistent underrepresentation of African Americans on jury venires, the
district court rejected the fair cross section challenge because other
factors could have also contributed to the underrepresentation.145
According to Rose and Abramson, “the problem was that defense evidence could not pinpoint how much of the underrepresentation of
African Americans was due to these systematic flaws, as opposed to the
more practical problems that do not stem from state action.”146 As a
result of this high burden of proof, the government is not held accountable for implementing jury-selection procedures that lead to the
systematic exclusion of distinctive groups from jury venires which can
prejudice certain defendants.
B. Undermining Civic Participation
More directly, the courts of appeals’ application of the Duren test
undermines the civic function of the jury. As Justice Anthony
Kennedy noted, “[j]ury service preserves the democratic element of
the law” and “affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government, an experience fostering, one
hopes, a respect for law.”147 By allowing continuous underrepresentation to go unchallenged, states and districts exclude members of certain groups from experiencing this democratic opportunity.148
If jury service is viewed as an opportunity for civic education,149
then assuming that members of certain groups “self select” off the jury
144

Id. at 947.
See Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (“[Defendants] had to prove not merely that inaccurate lists contribute to a degree to the underrepresentation of minorities, but the precise
degree to which they are responsible, i.e., that inaccurate lists (as opposed to transience or
personal choice) are the main culprit. That burden is far, far, too high . . . .”).
146
Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 951. Professor Abramson advised the court
during the case and “recommended that the judge find no Sixth Amendment violation
because of ambiguous data regarding the ‘systematic exclusion’ prong of the Duren test.”
Id. at 949. There were at least three sources of underrepresentation: (1) “the disproportionate undercounting of this group in the initial city and town census lists”; (2) “the return by the post office of some summonses as undeliverable”; and (3) “the failure of some
persons to respond to jury summonses that were not marked undeliverable by the post
office.” Id. at 950. The defense was unable to show how each factor contributed to the
overall disparity and was thus not able to satisfy the heightened causal requirement applied
by the First Circuit. Id. at 950–51.
147
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (Harlan , J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148
See, e.g., Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 79–80 (concluding that the court could not continue to “cast a blind eye to real problems with the representation of African-Americans on
[its] juries”).
149
See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (noting that jurors were thought as “student[s]
of democracy”).
145

R
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because they fail to participate in other civic activities denies this education to those most in need of it. For instance, if members of certain
groups are systematically underrepresented because they register to
vote in lower numbers, excusing those nonvoters from jury service
perpetuates the cycle of underrepresentation on voting lists. This, in
turn, leads to continued underrepresentation on jury venires.
Likewise, potential jurors are often excused because they are difficult to reach.150 These “hard-to-reach” citizens are therefore deprived of the opportunity to exercise the rights and duties of
citizenship. Although a state or district is entitled to exclude certain
potential jurors for legitimate reasons, it is the government’s burden
to justify that the State’s interest outweighs the individual defendant’s
right.151 It may be the case that the difficulty of summonsing hard-toreach citizens implicates a legitimate state interest. Courts, however,
do not require the government to argue its interest when rejecting
fair cross section claims based on the government’s failure to inform
citizens about jury service.152
For example, in United States v. Nakai, the Ninth Circuit dismissed
a fair cross section claim where Native Americans were systematically
excluded from jury venires. The defendant argued that Native Americans were systematically excluded from jury venires because the jury
commission contacted potential jurors by phone to follow up on the
summonses, but phones were scarce on the reservation. As a result,
Native Americans were less likely to be informed about the details of
their summonses.153 Rather than require the government to demonstrate that it was a legitimate state interest not to make a greater effort
to contact Native Americans, the court placed the burden on the
defendant to prove that the scarcity of phones on the reservation was
the cause of the underrepresentation of Native Americans on jury
venires.154 As a result, the jury-selection procedure was upheld despite the fact that many Native Americans were not informed about

150
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 951 (“[N]o court before the Green decision
had ever found factors such as undeliverable mail or nonresponse to constitute the kind of
‘systematic’ exclusions of members of a cognizable group that triggers a constitutional
violation.”).
151
See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 (1979) (“[I]t is the State that bears the
burden of justifying this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be
incompatible with a significant state interest.”); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
534 (1975) (“The States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals in
case of special hardship or incapacity and to those engaged in particular occupations the
uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community’s welfare.”).
152
See, e.g., United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (placing the
burden of proof on the defendant).
153
Id.
154
See id.
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the details of their jury service and, therefore, did not show for jury
service.155
C. Undermining Legitimacy
The argument that the fair cross section requirement serves the
legitimacy function of the jury derives from the original fair cross section case, Taylor v. Louisiana. In Taylor, Justice Byron White noted
“[c]ommunity participation in the administration of the criminal
law . . . is . . . critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”156 When the fair cross section guarantee is understood as serving the jury’s legitimacy function, requiring that
defendants prove how a particular jury-selection procedure is the
cause of a pattern of unreasonable underrepresentation of a distinctive group is inconsistent with the purpose of the requirement. Regardless of how or why certain groups are underrepresented on jury
venires, the public’s confidence in the efficacy of legal outcomes is
diminished when certain distinctive groups are consistently omitted
from jury service.157
As noted earlier, courts of appeals reject fair cross section challenges despite evidence that a distinctive group is repeatedly underrepresented on jury venires.158 While the Duren Court stated that
certain affirmative state interests may absolve the state from constituting a representative jury venire,159 courts requiring that defendants
show how the jury-selection procedure caused underrepresentation
reject valid fair cross section challenges without ever considering the
state’s purpose for the jury-selection procedure. So long as a jury
commission does not engage in a specific jury-selection procedure
that can be easily linked to the underrepresentation of a distinctive
group, nonrepresentative jury venires can continue without
challenge.160
155

Id.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
157
See Ellis & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1049 (describing a study that found the
public is more likely to perceive a negative outcome for the defendant unfair when the jury
lacks racial diversity).
158
See supra Part II.E.
159
See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1979) (noting that the State has the
burden to show that a fair cross section is incompatible with a significant state interest).
160
See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing
fair cross section challenge despite statistical evidence of African Americans’ persistent
underrepresentation on jury venires); Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 395, 402–03 (5th Cir.
2011) (rejecting fair cross section challenge even if the defendant were to have shown
“Hispanics [and] persons 18 to 34” were underrepresented on the jury venires); United
States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 790 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a fair cross section challenge where jury lists were based on voter-registration lists but African American and Hispanics in North Dakota registered in lower proportion than whites in North Dakota);
United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a fair cross section
156
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When jury venires consistently underrepresent certain groups,
the juries that are ultimately drawn will likewise be less representative
of the community. To be sure, the composition of the jury venire is
not the only factor that determines the ultimate composition of a particular jury, but it is an important factor.161 If certain groups are always underrepresented (or not represented) on jury venires, it stands
to reason that members of those groups will be less likely to serve on
juries and, ultimately, juries will be less diverse. And as Leslie Ellis
and Shari Diamond demonstrate, public perception of fairness is negatively correlated with less representative juries.162
Moreover, the mere perception that certain groups are unlikely
to be called for jury duty also undermines faith in the judicial system.
The Fifth Circuit understood this idea when deciding Rabinowitz v.
United States, a seminal case prompting the passage of the JSSA.163
Judge Richard Rives noted that such procedures undermine public
confidence in the courts because “many citizens will have no direct
contact with the administration of justice, but will judge its efficacy on
how the judicial process functions.”164 Those unfairly excluded from
jury service will hold negative opinions of the judicial process, and,
similarly, those who recognize the unfairness in the selection of jurors
will also hold the judicial system in lower esteem.
IV
A BETTER APPROACH: PRESUMING CAUSATION
A better approach for resolving fair cross section challenges
would be for courts to presume that the jury-selection procedures
cause underrepresentation when a defendant shows that there is a pattern of underrepresentation of distinctive groups on jury venires.165
Courts should no longer require that defendants demonstrate how
the jury-selection procedure caused the underrepresentation of a distinctive group. Instead, if there is a long-standing history of underclaim despite the fact that African Americans made up just under eight percent of the jury
venires but represented twenty-one percent of the population).
161
For example, peremptory challenges are another factor that cause specific juries to
underrepresent certain distinctive groups. See Ellis & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1036–37.
162
Id. at 1049.
163
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
164
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 59 (5th Cir. 1966).
165
Such a burden-shifting approach was put forth by a defendant, and rejected by the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Neighbors, 590 F.3d 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2009). In that
case, the defendant argued that the use of “voter registration lists[, which] generally
under-represent minorities in the community,” combined with the lack of African Americans on the jury venire, should create a presumption that the jury-selection procedure
caused the underrepresentation. The defendant argued that the same burden shift that
occurs in Batson cases should apply to Duren cases. Id. at 491–92. However, the Seventh
Circuit responded: “We have consistently held that the defendant bears the burden of
showing that the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion.” Id. at 492.
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representation, then it should be the government’s burden to
implement a jury-selection procedure that will lead to more
representative jury venires or to demonstrate that implementing such
procedures is inconsistent with another important state interest.166
Such an approach makes sense because in most situations the
jury-selection procedure is at least partly to blame for underrepresentation. To use the words of Duren, the underrepresentation
of a distinctive group is “due to their systematic exclusion in the juryselection process.”167 For example, it is a false argument that a state’s
lack of effort to contact potential jurors by mail does not cause, in
some way, the underrepresentation of certain groups who have a
greater propensity to move. While the state may have a legitimate interest in not undertaking more aggressive efforts to recruit potential
jurors, it should be the state’s burden to argue its interest. Hard-toreach citizens’ right to serve as jurors should be presumed valid,
rather than presumed to be inadequate to overcome the state’s
interest.
Under the current judicial approach, jurisdictions are willing to
look the other way when there are multiple causes of underrepresentation.168 Although some jurisdictions do take seriously the
need to ensure representation on jury venires despite the lack of judicial encouragement,169 a presumption of causation would require jury
commissions to update inadequate jury-selection procedures. Take,
for instance, the exclusive use of voter-registration lists. While it is
true that some individuals do not register to vote despite facing no
barriers to doing so,170 it is not right to say that the exclusive use of a
166
It would not be the case that the government would be forced to prove that the
jury-selection procedure was not responsible for the underrepresentation. If there is longstanding underrepresentation of distinctive groups on the jury venire, then it would be the
government’s burden to implement jury-selection procedures that are capable of compiling a representative jury venire. The government, however, can argue that the task of
compiling a representative jury venire conflicts with other important state interests.
167
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
168
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 952–54. However, voluntary improvements
in some chastened districts do not solve the problem. Creating a presumption that the jury
procedure caused the underrepresentation when the defendant shows a pattern that distinctive groups are consistently left out of jury venires would force jury commissions to
work harder to live up to the cross-sectional ideal.
169
In some cases where the government prevailed in a fair cross section challenge,
districts have amended their procedures to ensure better representation. See, e.g., Berghuis
v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 322 (2010) (noting that the district reversed its jury-selection procedure at issue after the defendant was convicted); Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 953
(noting that after Green “[i]t is now the district’s procedure to do a second mailing,
targeted by zip code, for every summons returned by the post office as undeliverable”).
170
Cf. Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 915 n.22 (noting comments by the chair of
the committee of federal judges who drafted an early version of the JSSA stating that the
use of voter-registration lists would eliminate from jury pools “those individuals not interested enough in their government to vote” (citation omitted)).
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voter-registration list in compiling the jury venire does not cause the
omission of the nonvoter from jury duty. Under a framework that
presumes a fair cross section violation when there is a pattern of
underrepresentation, if voting-registration lists are inadequate to secure a fair cross section of the community in jury venires, then the
jury commission would be forced to supplement voter-registration lists
with other lists that provide for greater representation.171
By creating this presumption, the functions of the jury—checking
government power, promoting civic engagement, and providing legitimacy to legal outcomes—would be supported, rather than undermined, by the fair cross section guarantee. The power of government
would be checked because there would be less room for courts to hide
behind causal ambiguity to perpetuate nonrepresentative jury
venires.172 Civic engagement would be enhanced by opening jury service to those who “self select” out of other forms of democratic participation, and, perhaps, encouraging those citizens to engage in other
aspects of civic life.173 And legitimacy would be bolstered by ensuring
that the jury venire is not a contributor to unrepresentative juries,
while also instilling confidence in the public by requiring the government to present a legitimate state interest to justify the exclusion of
any group on jury venires.174
CONCLUSION
The jury serves a number of functions. It is a check on government power. It promotes civic participation. And it legitimizes legal
outcomes. As an important aspect of the right to an impartial jury,
the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section guarantee should promote
these functions.175 Despite the purpose of the fair cross section guarantee, the right is undermined by the application of the Duren test in
lower courts. In applying the third prong of the Duren test, some
courts require defendants to demonstrate exactly how the juryselection procedure is causally related to a pattern of under171
In fact, the JSSA seems to require as much. While the JSSA suggests voterregistration lists as a source for jury-selection lists, the statute also instructs that “[t]he plan
shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition to voter lists where
necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured” by the JSSA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1863(b)(2) (2012). Yet, despite the JSSA, “[t]he circuit courts are in complete agreement that . . . neither the Act nor the Constitution require that a supplemental source of
names be added to voter lists simply because an identifiable group votes in a proportion
lower than the rest of the population.” United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 412 (6th
Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
172
Cf. supra Part III.A.
173
Cf. supra Part III.B.
174
Cf. supra Part III.C.
175
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1975) (explaining the functions of
the jury and the need to promote its “solid foundation”).
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representation.176 The problem is that there may be multiple causes
of underrepresentation.177 As a result, fair cross section challenges
are nearly always rejected, at least at the court of appeals level.178 Indeed, even where there is evidence that distinctive groups are omitted
from jury venires, the courts uphold the selection procedures and
sanction nonrepresentative juries.179 This stringent application of the
third prong of the Duren test undermines each of the three jury functions by sanctioning jury venires that are inherently underrepresentative of certain groups. The courts of appeals’ application of Duren
allows the government to continue to implement inadequate juryselection procedures, deprives certain citizens the opportunity to
serve on juries, and may undermine public faith in legal outcomes.
A better approach is for courts to create a presumption that a
pattern of underrepresentation of distinctive groups on jury venires is
due to the jury-selection procedures. Such a presumption is consistent with Duren’s three-part framework. The first prong of the Duren
test defines the distinctive group. The second prong defines the acceptable deviation between the proportion that group represents in
the community and the proportion it represents on jury venires. The
third prong helps the court determine whether the particular instance
of underrepresentation is part of a pattern or is merely an anomaly.
There is no need for courts to require that defendants show how juryselection procedures lead to systematic exclusion of distinctive groups
from jury venires. Rather, it should be enough for the defendant to
show that a systematic exclusion of a distinctive group occurs because
it will likely be the case that the jury-selection procedure is, at least,
partially causally related to the underrepresentation. The government remains free to argue that the jury-selection procedure is not
related to the underrepresentation or that the reason for the underrepresentation is related to a legitimate state interest.
The current practice of requiring the defendant to show how the
jury-selection procedure causes nonrepresentative jury venires ensures
that fair cross section challenges are doomed to fail in almost every
instance, thus undermining the functions of the fair cross section
176
See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 473 F. App’x 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a
Sixth Amendment fair cross section challenge because “there is simply nothing in the
record indicating that the racial disparity at issue was caused by the [district court’s] jury
selection procedures”).
177
See Rose & Abramson, supra note 12, at 952 (noting numerous causes of misrepresentation, including “undeliverable mail, out-of-date addresses, and a failure to do anything about high levels of nonresponse”).
178
See Chernoff, supra note 57, at 145 (“When defendants claim that their jury was
selected in violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right, . . . their claims are
usually denied.”).
179
See id. at 145–47 (“[E]ven while denying defendants’ claims, [some courts] have
admitted to being disturbed by the evidence of racial disparities in jury systems.”).
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right and, more generally, the jury. By removing the burden from
defendants to prove causation, the fair cross section guarantee will
actually promote the functions of the jury and ensure that the ideal of
the fair cross section guarantee is more fully realized.

